Russia has enjoyed great success in rebuilding bridges in the USA’s backyard, says Marcus Papadopoulos
The current global financial crisis has left no developed country unscathed. Every member of the G8, along with the emerging economies of China, India and Brazil, has experienced stagnant economic growth resulting in increasing levels of unemployment and, in some cases, an increase in state taxes.
Russia, whose economy is overwhelmingly commodity-based, has been hit hard. According to some estimates, the Russian economy shrank by more than 10 per cent in the first five months of this year. Indeed, Andrei Klepach, the deputy economic minister, said that should Russia’s gross domestic decline by only 6 per cent in 2009, this would represent a “heroic achievement for the economy”.
Dependency on oil and gas for its wealth – commodities whose monetary value often fluctuates – lends support to the notion that Russia is a giant with feet of clay.
That all said, owing to the billions of dollars it has in currency reserves from its status as an energy superpower, Russia appears to be weathering the economic storm. The industrial world’s need for energy means a constant supply of customers have no choice but to pay the Russians whatever rate oil and gas are valued at.
Perhaps nothing is more evident of the Kremlin’s confidence in its ability to ride the storm than its pursuit of foreign policy objectives in Latin America – a continent Josef Stalin once referred to as the “obedient army of the United States”.
Historically, US foreign policymakers have long regarded Latin America as Washington’s backyard. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823, a US policy asserting that European powers are prohibited from interfering in the internal affairs of the Latin American countries, has been invoked by various American administrations over time to safeguard US interests in the continent.
After the proclamation of a socialist regime in Cuba in 1959 by Fidel Castro and the subsequent forging of close relations with the Soviet Union, the doctrine was invoked again as the Americans feared their security could be jeopardised if Moscow gained a foothold in the region with the establishment of client states.
What followed in Latin America for nearly 30 years was a hotting up of the Cold War, as the Soviet government sought to increase its influence by supporting Marxist-Leninist regimes, such as in Cuba and Nicaragua, and by arming revolutionary movements in Peru and El Salvador.
However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, links between Latin America’s socialist states and the Russian Federation were dismantled. This was partly a result of Moscow having been consumed by domestic economic chaos.
But with the coming to power of Vladimir Putin in 2000 and buoyed by the high price of oil, Russia began to reassert itself in the international arena.
Concerned by Nato’s presence in eastern Europe and by Washington’s close relations with former Soviet republics Ukraine and Georgia, the Kremlin took the decision to try to regain its old Soviet-era influence in Latin America as a way of countering what it continues to regard as the US’s dangerous presence on Russia’s periphery.
Opportunity for this came in 2006 when the US imposed an arms embargo on Venezuela following Washington’s allegations that Hugo Chávez was not co-operating with counter-terrorist efforts. Venezuela’s leader had to look elsewhere for military assistance and Russia was only too willing to answer the call.
Chávez’ anti-Americanism, which at times even exceeds that of the Kremlin’s, has proved to be the catalyst that has enabled Russia to re-establish a presence in Latin American. Over the past few years, the Russians have signed agreements and memorandums with numerous “Latin American comrades” – an expression the Kremlin uses to describe governments which are trying to assert their independence from Washington and which have turned to Russia for assistance.
Spearheading Moscow’s return to Latin America is deputy prime minister Igor Sechin. During the Cold War, he was the KGB’s man responsible for smuggling shipments of arms to countries and movements which had aligned themselves to the Soviet Union. An expert on Latin American politics, Sechin is now the Kremlin’s eyes and ears in the continent, as well as its main negotiator with governments in the region,
Developing military contacts in Latin America has been at the forefront of the Russians’ strategy. Since the break in relations between Caracas and Washington, Venezuela has signed arms deals with Russia totalling more than $4.4 billion. These have seen the delivery of Russian combat aircraft, helicopter gunships, transport helicopters, Kalashnikov rifles and air, surface and anti-ship missiles to the Venezuelan military. In September, military ties were further strengthened when Russia agreed to lend Venezuela $2.2 billion to buy additional Russian arms, including the formidable S-300 air defence system, which might make US planners think twice about launching any invasion of the self-proclaimed socialist state.
Russia has also signed or entered into negotiations with Ecuador and Guatemala for the supply of military hardware. Following talks this year between Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and his Ecuadorian counterpart Rafael Correa, it was announced that Russia would equip the north-eastern Latin American country with transport helicopters. This could soon be followed by the supply of combat aircraft, bombers and missile systems. At the beginning of this year, Guatemala said it was interested in a proposal whereby it would acquire Russian military equipment in exchange for food, such as coffee and sugar.
Under the leadership of Evo Morales, Bolivia agreed to buy five civil defence helicopters as a “first step” in broadening ties between Moscow and La Paz. Russia’s ambassador to Bolivia, Leonid Golubev, expressed “great satisfaction” with Morales’ “socialist-oriented” government and added: “We want to show the United States that Latin America is not their backyard.”
Russia has also been resurrecting ties with Cuba and Nicaragua, two states it had extremely close relations with during the Cold War.
The Soviet Union was Cuba’s most ardent friend and ally – and its protector. However, with the demise of the Soviet colossus in 1991, Cuban-Russian relations waned considerably as Moscow withdrew from the international arena. In 2001, the Russians closed down their signal intelligence site in Lourdes, near Havana.
But now Russia is actively pursuing the restoration of close relations with the Caribbean island. Russian and Cuban delegations have met on numerous occasions over the past year, discussing economic, political and military co-operation. These renewed contacts culminated last autumn when a Russian Orthodox cathedral was consecrated in Havana.
This renewed relatonshiip prompted a senior US official to say that the Russian Federation “has strategic ties to Cuba again – or at least that’s where they’re going.”
The return to power two years ago in Nicaragua of Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega caught the eye of the Kremlin. Ortega, who positioned his country in the Soviet orbit during the 1980s, has been as eager as the Russians to re-establish close ties. Both have entered into negotiations involving the Russian construction of hydro and geothermal installations in Nicaragua, as well as Russian participation in building a canal across the country which would link the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
At a meeting between the two leaders, Medvedev informed Ortega: “I would like our Nicaraguan partners to know that our presence in Latin America and warm relations with key partners are not a temporary factor, but a deliberate choice.”
The extent of Russia’s return to Latin America was demonstrated late last year when a flotilla of Russian warships visited Cuba and Venezuela and passed through the Panama Canal, and when Venezuela hosted two Russian nuclear bombers.
Tangible results are already evident from Russia’s efforts to re-engage with the region. It has increased revenue from the sale of arms and laid the foundations for the possible creation of client states. And it has gained support for its international actions. Venezuela and Nicaragua have recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, following in the footsteps of Russia, whose victorious war with Georgia last summer resulted in both secessionist regions breaking away from Tbilisi.
With the US preoccupied with the war in Afghanistan, the Kremlin is losing no time in taking advantage of this by approaching old friends and engaging with potential new ones in Latin America. Not only is Washington alive to Moscow actions, so too are the US’s allies in the continent. Late last year, then Colombian defence minister Juan Manuel Santos warned that Russia’s “presence in the region will promote a return to the Cold War”. He added: “Who would have thought a couple of years ago that there would be a new centre of the Cold War near us?”
Russia still has much to do if it is to ever restore its former level of relations with Latin American nations. This will take time and effort – and Moscow has a lot of convincing to do, especially as far Cuba is concerned. But one thing is for sure: in the words of President Medvedev: “Russia has returned to Latin America, including Cuba.”
