Putin and the Rise of Russia: The Country that Came in from the Cold by Michael Stuermer
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, £20
This book is partly a biography of Vladimir Putin and partly an assessment of his leadership of Russia. Despite being one of the most influential political leaders in the world, comparatively little is known about the former KGB officer who rose to the top of a country apparently in terminal decline and has since set it on course to reclaiming much of its lost superpower status. Regrettably, Michael Stuermer, chief correspondent of Die Welt, offers few revelations. Nonetheless, he offers analysis on aspects of the political scene which, although well-known to seasoned observers of Russia, are not widely reported by media in the West.
The Munich security conference, held at the Bayerischer Hof in 2007, is the scene of the opening chapter and was chosen by Stuermer because “future historians of world affairs will remember Putin’s speech in Munich as the turning point from uneasy accommodation to measured defiance”. The Russian leader took the opportunity to vent his frustration and anger at how, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia’s interests had been, in his view, sidelined by the West and its security threatened by Nato’s expansion to its western borders.
He said: “The unipolar model [projected by the United States] is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. What we are seeing is ever greater disdain for the principles of international law. One state, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations.”
Although tension had been brewing between Moscow and Washington long before this speech – over issues ranging from Nato’s presence in eastern Europe to the US decision to withdraw its participation in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed between the US and USSR in 1972 – Putin’s words were interpreted by many Western commentators as symbolising the beginning of a new era of confrontation between Russia and
the United States.
Stuermer presents a brief overview of the stages in Putin’s career leading up to his appointment as Prime Minister in August 1999, which led to him becoming President on December 31 1999. We learn how Putin, at the age of 17, went to his local KGB branch in Leningrad and asked to be admitted to the Soviet secret police. He was told to go to university and study law, and then apply. And he did exactly that.
Speeding forward to Putin’s time as President of Russia, the most interesting chapters concern the composition of the Russian leader’s inner circle and the emergence of Gazprom, the Russian gas giant whose position as Europe’s leading supplier of gas sends shivers down the spine of European Union policy makers.
Stuermer notes that under Putin members of the siloviki, men from the power agencies in Russia, the secret service and the military, occupy the most senior positions within the Russian government, both nationally and locally. He refers to the “siloviki republic” and says it explains how Putin has been able to roll back the democratic reforms which took place under Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. He says: “The mentality, the culture and the world view now prevalent in the Kremlin bear the hallmarks of the old KGB. Three out of four senior Russian officials today were once affiliated with the KGB or related organisations.”
“What is good for Gazprom is good for Russia.” Stuermer uses the words that once described the importance of General Motors to the United States to spell out just how crucial Gazprom is to Russia’s position in the international arena. While the author makes it clear that it is a two-way relationship between the Russian gas industry and Brussels – Europe depends on Russia for between 40 and 50 per cent of its industrial and domestic consumption of gas and, in turn, the Russians need the European market to generate money – he says that Russia holds the dominant position and that the EU realises it is not in its interests to “irritate the bear”.
There is one clear error in the book; the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow – destroyed by Stalin and rebuilt by Yeltsin – is said to be on Red Square. It is, in fact, some distance away. But Putin and the Rise of Russia provides a concise analysis of how Russia has re-emerged with a vengeance in world affairs and of the man who has been responsible for this. It is, by and large, old hat to observers of Russian politics but is nevertheless informative for the lay person wishing to understand the possible future course of the Russian bear’s global reach.
Marcus Papadopoulos
