Although the events covered in this book took place more than half a century ago, they throw some useful light on more recent happenings. Given the extent to which the Blair Government sought to win over public opinion prior to the invasion of Iraq, the Chilcot inquiry could do worse than take time out to read Tony Shaw’s fascinating account of similar attempts by Anthony Eden’s government in the build up to the Suez invasion in 1956.
Shaw’s findings make chilling reading. Until recently, the judgement of history was that the British media had demonstrated an admirable independence from the government during the Suez crisis; it was seen as having stood up to Eden by revealing both the government’s mendacity in the build-up to the invasion and the intense opposition Eden’s adventure engendered, not just internationally but, more crucially, on the domestic front.
Not so. Shaw demonstrates that both the press and the broadcasters, with some honourable exceptions, failed miserably. Apart from the Manchester Guardian and the News Chronicle, Britain’s national dailies were then (mostly as now) owned by old-fashioned press barons who, by and large, regarded Suez as one more chapter in the glorious history of the British Empire.
However, this was not the main cause of the press failure to carry out its traditional watchdog role. Shaw demonstrates that it was the shortcomings of the Westminster lobby system, adeptly exploited by Eden and his press secretary, William Clark, that was most to blame. By adept use of its rules of non-attribution, and by taking particularly favoured correspondents into their confidence, the Eden Government gave the press information that it couldn’t, or wouldn’t use. Thus the press became primary players in a conspiracy of silence against the public; and, just in case the old pals’ act failed to work, Shaw points to the battery of restrictions that the Government also had at its disposal.
Broadcasters were supposed to be different but, says Shaw, they weren’t. He argues that the BBC, and, to a lesser extent, ITV, demonstrated the same enthusiasm for
self-censorship as that displayed by the press, with the corporation’s current affairs output particularly culpable. During the build-up to the war the broadcasters supinely accepted Government entreaties not to report all they knew.
Shaw argues: “This deference to authority, symptomatic of the institutionalised nature of broadcasting in Britain, helped to foster Eden’s conciliatory image significantly.” The effect of this was “to hide from its licence payers the growing domestic upheaval surrounding Eden’s policy.”
Shaw concludes that the Suez crisis “acted as a salutary warning to successive governments of the perils of taking actions abroad without sufficient internal and external public support.”
It’s a pity that this book did not cross the desk of Tony Blair, or his media advisers, in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq; for it just might have given them cause to pause a little longer for sober reflection.
Finally, a quibble. This book was first published in hardback in 1996; in the preface to this new edition Shaw notes the “uncanny resemblance” between the invasions of Suez and Iraq but goes on to say that “I have resisted making any changes to this paperback edition”. That’s a shame, for had his resistance weakened he might have produced a work not just of historical interest but of powerful relevance today as the debate about the invasion of Iraq continues to rage.
