According to Noam Chomsky, Barack Obama’s reaction to the Egyptian revolution conforms to the normal response of the United States when one of its “favoured dictators” is losing control. “There is a kind of a standard routine”, referring to the likes of the Duvaliers in Haiti. “Keep supporting them for as long as possible. Then, when it becomes unsustainable – typically, say, if the army shifts sides – switch 180 degrees, claim to have been on the side of the people all along, erase the past and then make whatever moves are possible to restore the old system under new names.”
What this does not take into account is what the Americans might do if they are unable to restore the old system. While the situation in the Middle East remains volatile and uncertain, it is clear that the events witnessed over the past month will lead to a dramatic reconfiguration of power in the region. Should this jeopardise Western strategic interests, the US and its allies are likely to use all available means to reassert their influence.
Nearly five-and-half decades have passed since Anglo-French troops landed in Port Said and Israeli forces crossed into the Sinai peninsula to try and wrest back control of the Suez Canal, newly nationalised by President Gamal Nasser. While much has changed since then, the strategic importance of the canal and the pipeline that runs beside it are undiminished. With their economies dependent on oil and gas, the Western powers are determined to prevent anything that might restrict the access of their tankers, battleships and aircraft carriers through the canal. Asked what action the US would take should travel through the shipping channel be disrupted, General James Mattis, the head of US Central Command, replied that: “We would have to deal with it diplomatically, economically, militarily”.
Despite the rhetoric to the contrary, policymakers in Washington are deeply concerned at the sudden and unprecedented rise of people power that is sweeping Middle East countries. Comparisons have been drawn with Iran’s revolution in 1979 and fears expressed about the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, but most analysts agree that Egyptians do not want to create an Islamic state. Indeed, according to a recent opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Centre, 70 per cent of Egyptians were concerned at the global rise of Islamic extremism.
Nevertheless, even the confluence of a number of factors, including a strong civil society movement and a moderate potential Egyptian leader in the shape of either Mohamed El Baradei , Ayman Nour or Amr Moussa do not quell fears in Washington. The Americans know that democracies are hard to predict and harder to control. Even a moderate, Western-looking democracy in Egypt would not prioritise US interests in the way that Mubarak’s regime has done for 30 years. And it would also take a much harder line on Israel.
In January, ahead of a meeting between Benjamin Netanyahu and Hosni Mubarak to discuss the stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Jordan’s King Abdullah warned that: “The deadlocked peace process threatens the entire region”. The revolutions in Egypt and beyond make the need for intensive direct negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians more pressing than ever. Sadly, rather than pushing Israel towards the negotiating table, the recent geo-political shifts are likely to force the Israelis to even greater militarised isolationism.
Mubarak’s fall means the loss of a key regional ally. Israel fears that Jordan, another key partner, could follow Egypt’s example. Despite assurances by El Baradei that the 30-year peace treaty between the two countries would remain “rock solid” if he formed a government, Israel fears the treaty could be abrogated and that Egypt’s border with Gaza could be opened.
Doubtless America has contingency plans for whenever one of its brutally autocratic allies, such as Mubarak, loses power. However, the US has not been prepared for the speed, force and direction of recent change. It is now playing catch-up, working to ensure a new Egyptian leadership that will be both legitimate in the eyes of the Egyptian people and sympathetic to the US . If this cannot be achieved and an unfriendly government looks likely to take power in Cairo, the US and its allies will act – overtly or covertly – to safeguard their interests.
Throughout the Cold War and beyond, the US supported insurgent groups, sponsored coups, and fought real and proxy wars in order to protect and extend its influence. While the recent images of opposing groups hurling stones at each other in Tahir Square were horrifying enough, imagine the carnage if one or both of those groups had been equipped with guns.
In his 2009 speech in Cairo, President Obama acknowledged that tensions between the Western and Muslim worlds have “been fed by colonialism that denied rights and opportunities to many Muslims and a Cold War in which Muslim-majority countries were too often treated as proxies without regard to their own aspirations”.
He failed to mention that, long after the fall of the Berlin Wall, many of these countries were still being treated as proxies with their leaders – such as Hosni Mubarak – propped up by the West.
As these leaders start to be toppled, the test for Obama will be the extent to which he can reign in the natural instincts of other US foreign policymakers and allow genuine democracy to take root in the Middle East’s shifting sands.
Stefan Simanowitz is a journalist, writer and political analyst
